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"STATE ACTION" REQUIRErvENT
AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF STRICT
ADHERENCE TO THE "STATE ACTION"
REQUIREMENT
SHEPA D W. MCKENNEY
The decisions of the past twenty years of the United States
Supreme Court concerning the concept of state action as ap-
plied in the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments have employed
exceptionally broad and sweeping reasoning to arrive at the re-
sults obtained.' Indeed, it has been recently suggested by one
observer that we no longer need consider whether state action
is present in any given case, because, "through developments con-
cerning 'color of state law', state inaction, private groups and
organizations becoming sufficiently. oriented to public concern
to justify public control, and judicial control- of private agree-.
ments, state action is so permeating that it is present in virtually
all cases." 2 Such an interpretation of the fourteenth amendment
would seem to remove the single serious impediment to federal
judicial control of traditionally local relationships. If this is the
case, the much more basic question of the effect of such an inter-
pretation on the functioning of the federal system is raised. Con-
sider the argument of Alexander Hamilton, speaking in The
Federalist, No. 17:
It may be said that it-the then proposed constitution
would tend to render the government of the Union too
powerful, and enable it to absorb those residuary authorities,
which it may be judged proper to leave with the states for
local purposes...
1 The significant portions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments for
the purposes of this article are: "No.state shall make or enforce any
lav which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U. S. Const. amend
XIV.
"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude." U. S. Const. amend. XV.
Due to the fact that most of the cases referred to deal with the four-
teenth amendment, in most instances this will be the sole points of
reference in regard to "state action".
2 Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 Texas L. Rev. 347, 389.
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There is one transcendent advantage belonging to the
province of the state governments, which suffices to place
the matter in a clear and satisfactory light,-I mean the
ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. This,
of all others, is the most powerful, most universal, and most
attractive source of popular obedience and attachment. It
is that which, being the immediate and visible guardian of
life and property, having its benefits and its terrors in con-
stant activity before the public eye, regulating all those
personal interests and familiar concerns to which the sensi-
bility of individuals is more than any other circumstance, to
impressing upon the minds of the people, affection, esteem,
and reverence towards the government. This great cement
of society, which will diffuse itself almost wholly through
the channels of the particular governments, independent of
all other causes of influence, would insure them so decided
an empire over their respective citizens as to render them
at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently,
dangerous rivals to the power of the Union. (Emphasis
added.)3
When the Civil Rights Cases4 were decided in 1883, Justice
Bradley recognized the fact that the enactment of the fourteenth
amendment did not render the argument of Hamilton inappli-
cable to the federal system as altered. 5 In the Civil Rights Cases,
the question for decision was the constitutionality of an act of
Congress which provided, in part, "that all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities,
and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, thea-
tres, and other places of public amusement .. " Justice Bradley,
speaking for the majority of the Court held that the act of Con-
gress could not be sustained. He reasoned that the fourteenth
amendment was prohibitive in character and thus "appropriate
legislation" as used in the amendment meant only legislation to
enforce the prohibition. And a grant of power to prohibit state
action is not a grant of power to supplant all state authority in
3 Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST, 97 (Lodge 1888).
4109 U. S. 3 (1883).
5See generally Flack, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1908).
6 18 Stat. 335.
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that area. Justice Bradley contended that otherwise Congress
would have the power to control individual action not only in
the area of equal protection of the laws, but also as to "life,
liberty, and property." If such power were vested in Congress,
he said, "it is difficult to see where it is to stop." " It was the
first and the last time to date that a majority opinion of the
Court has given serious consideration to the problem of the
erosion of the federal system through relaxation of the "state
action" requirement.
Justice Harlan, in his dissent, replied to the majority argu-
ments by contending that the right to use public accommodations
was an attribute of United States citizenship and that since all
persons born or naturalized in the United States were citizens
by the first section of the fourteenth amendment, it followed
that the act only codified a pre-existing right. Assuming the first
premise could be satisfactorily established, it was a pretty strong
argument. It was, however, his second argument which survives
today as the most important part of the dissent.8 That argument
was that state regulation and licensing of inns, theatres, and rail-
roads provided sufficient state nexus with these facilities so as
to make their acts acts of the fourteenth amendment. Because they
were regulated by the state, he reasoned in reverse, they were
"corporations and individuals wielding public authority." He
was then able to conclude that, "The supreme law of the land
has decreed that no authority shall be exercised in this country
on the basis of discrimination." 9 (Emphasis added.) It would
appear that Justice Harlan failed to consider the distinction which
Justice Bradley made the focal point of his opinion, i.e., the
distinction between power to prohibit affirmative state govern-
ment action and the power to prohibit action which could be
state action if the state chose to exercise its regulatory power in
that manner.
The failure to cope with this distinction leads inevitably to
the conclusion that all acts are "state acts". The statement "no
authority shall be exercised" practically admits this. To Justice
Harlan, there is no distinction between a public inn and a public
7 Note 4 supra at 23.
8 This argument was revived most strongly in Garner v. Louisiana, infra
by Justice Douglas.
9 Note 4 supra at 57.
1964]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:213
highway. As long as the facility operates under the "license
of the law" its acts are state acts. There is no distinction between
a public utility, franchised by the state with a government
granted monopoly, and the corner grocery store. The sole
test is "license of the law". Unless we take this phrase to mean
mere permission of the law, it must mean some form of formal
license. After all, if it were mere permission, all legal acts
would be state acts. Even Justice Harlan is more subtle than
that. The application of the fourteenth amendment then depends
on the state license of the activity. But if the state chooses not
to require a license for an activity, is that activity then exempt
from the fourteenth amendment? Should the application of the
fundamental guarantees of the Constitution depend on the whim
of the state to license? 10 Clearly not. Therefore, the fourteenth
amendment must extend to all activities which the state could
license. The power of the state to license is limited only by the
terms of its constitution. Since a state may not hide behind its
constitution to deny a federal right, all activities are licensable;
all licensable activities fall within the "state action" requirement;
and therefore the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment reach
all forms of activity.
This argument may sound far-fetched, but it is not, because
any one point is an unreasonable extension of the former points.
It is because the premise of the argument, i.e., the "license of the
law" test, is so indefensibly broad. In attempting to explain the
state action concept with such a test, the concept itself is de-
stroyed." The phrase, "license of the law", does not explain the
words-rather, it erases them.
Following the decision in the Civil Rights Cases, there was
a long period during which the question of "state action" did
10 Cf Rice v. Elmore. 165 F 2d 387 (C.C.A. 4th, 1947). In that case (shortly
after the decision in Smith v. Allwright 321 U.S. 649 (1944) which
held that due to the statutory control over primaries the persons run-
ning the primaries were subject to the provisions of the fifteenth
amendment) South Carolina contended that because it had repealed all
statutory and constitutional provisions relating to primary elections
that federal rights were no longer applicable. It was held that the
state could not divest itself of its responsibility simply by repealing the
laws.
11 One writer is happy to dance at the funeral. See St. Antoine, Color
Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State Actions, Equal
Protection, and "Private" Discrimination, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 993.
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not come before the Supreme Court. Then beginning in 1941,
a steady stream of decisions were handed down defining and/or
carving out exceptions to Justice Bradley's "state action of a
particular character". These decisions have found "state action"
where the state was not directly. involved by finding that: (1)
An organization was acting in a capacity so vested with govern-
mental authority as to amount, to "state action"; (2) An in-
dividual was acting under color of state law; (3) The state was
aiding private interests in engaging in prohibited practices; or
(4) Local custom was so strong that it amounted to "state action".
Governmental Authority
This concept was introduced in the so-called "white primary
cases". The first and most famous of these is United States v.
Classia.12 In that case, the question for decision was "whether
the right of qualified voters to vote in the Louisiana primary...
is a right 'secured by the constitution' as used in the Federal
Criminal Code." 13 The primary was strictly regulated by the
state and only those persons who followed the statutory pro-
cedure for primary elections could even be placed on the,
official ballot at the general election. Also, this being the demo-
cratic primary, the winners of this primary election had a 100
per cent chance of success in the general election. Justice Stone,
speaking for the majority, said:
The right to participate in the choice for representatives
for Congress includes.., the right to cast a ballot and have
it counted at the general election, whether for the success-
ful candidate or not. Where the state law has made the
primary an integral part of the procedure of choice, or where
the primary effectively controls the choice, the right of the
elector to have his ballot counted at the primary is included
in the right protected by Article I, § 2 [of the Constitution].
Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the au-
thority of state law is (state) action. 14
12313 U. S. 299 (1941).
13 Id. at 307.14 ld. at 318.
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While the statute applied in this case supplies "color of
state law" 15 as the substantive test the significance of this case
for the purposes of this inquiry is that it shows how clearly and
uncontrovertibly a private organization can perform an act which
is a state act. This case does not stand for the proposition that
activity is state action if it may be performed by the state; nor
does it stand for the idea that st,te regulation of an activity
makes that activity state action. W/hat this case does stand for
is the proposition that a state may not avoid the mandates of the
fourteenth or fifteenth amendments by adopting the acts of
private organizations as a performance of its obligations in a
given area. On this basis, it is difficult to argue with the decision.
A case which involves a superficially similar problem is
Marsh v. Alabama.16 That case involved the right of a Jehovah's
Witness to distribute religious literature on the streets of a com-
pany-owned town. Justice Black said that:
In our view the circumstance that the property rights to
the premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved,
took place, were held by others than the public, is not suf-
ficient to justify the states permitting a corporation to
govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their funda-
mental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by
the application of state statute.17
The sequence of ideas in that sentence indicates how Justice
Black's reasoning goes. When he refers to the "deprivation of
liberty . . . involved" he answers his inquiry before it starts.
There is only a deprivation of liberty if the property involved
has lost its private character. And how has the company's prop-
erty lost its private character? By opening it to the public for
certain purposes? By allowing people to live on it in return for
15 The prosecution was under § 20 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Star.
27, which reads in part: ". . . any person who, under color of state
law ... shall subject,... any inhabitant of any state ... to deprivation
of any right secured by... the Constitution . .. shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor...
16 326 U. S. 501 (1945).
1 Id. at 509.
"STATE AcrioN" REQUIREMENT
rent? If property is open to the public for certain purposes, is it
public for all purposes? 1s
Justice Black contends that due to the lack of housing in the
area of the company's operations the employees are practically
forced to live there. Thus, he says, since the public must use
it the state must see that it is fairly used. But the employees do
not have any vested right to work for that company. If the
employee has gripes against the housing policy of the company,
that must be settled by employer-employee bargaining, not by
state intervention. As Justice Reed points out in his dissent,
The restrictions imposed by the owners upon the oc-
cupants are sometimes galling to employees and may ap-
pear unreasonable to outsiders. Unless they fall under the
prohibition of some legal rule, however, they are a matter for
adjustment between owner and licensee ...19
The freedoms of speech and religion may occupy a "pre-
ferred position", but that would hardly seem to mean that when
these rights come in private property rights go out. Freedom of
speech and religion occupy a "preferred position" 'where they
are applicable.20 Justice Black's reasoning, followed to its ulti-
mate conclusion means that if you rent out an upstairs room you
may have to put up with public speaking in the foyer-unwanted
by you or your tenant.
Is Consider Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp. 299 N. Y. 512, 87 N. E. 2nd
541 (1949). An action was brought to enjoin a private corporation
from discriminating against Negroes as tenants in a housing develop-
ment constructed by the corporation. The City of New York had
condemned the land for the corporation and had granted it certain tax
benefits in order to rehabilitate substandard housing. It was held that
"helpful cooperation" by the state did not make the acts of the corpora-
tion state acts. The court said that the "state acts" concept was appli-
cable to private organizations only where the state has consciously
exerted its power or where the governmental capacity has been recog-
nized by the state. Certiorari was denied by the U. S. Supreme Court,
339 U. S. 981. See Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of Political
and Economic Compulsion, 35 Col. L. Rev. 149 (1935).
19 Note 16 supra at 513.
20 All of the cases cited to support the "preferred position" theory refer
to nature of speech protected rather than the circumstances under
which the right exists. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 608; Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 115.
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Color of State Law
While the concept of "color of state law" was raised in
Ex Parte Virginia2' and the Classic case, the doctrine did not
receive a thorough examination until the case of Screws v. United
States.22 In that case, the defendant, a Georgia sheriff, legally
arrested a young Negro for stealing a tire and then with the
assistance of other state officers brutally beat him to death. De-
fendant was prosecuted under the same statute as used in the
Classic case. In holding that Screws was acting under "color of
state law", Justice Douglas said:
They were officers of the law who made the arrest. By
their own admissions, they assaulted Hall in order to protect
themselves and to keep their prisoners from escaping. It
was their duty under Georgia law to make the arrest ef-
fective. Hence their conduct comes within the statute.23
This piece of logic is a little confusing. Because the de-
fendants assert privilege by virtue of state authority, it is found
that they may be convicted of an act which is admittedly in
violation of state law. If the defendants' assertion that they were
forced to act as they did is correct, then they can be guilty of
no crime, federal or otherwise. If their assertion is incorrect, then
it cannot be relied on to prove "color of state law" since it has
no validity in the first place.
It has been argued that a contrary result would allow a state
to let its officers violate individual constitutional rights by the
simple expedient of not prosecuting under state law. This is
an excellent point. But the decision is not limited to cases in
which the state does not prosecute. Consider this as an alternative
to the reasoning used: An act directly in contravention of state
law can never be an act done under "color of state law". But
if a state refuses to prosecute its agent for such an act, the state
law obviously does not exist, at least for some purposes. In fact,
in such a case, it may be flatly said that there is no violation of
state law, since the state is the final arbiter of the question of
21 100 U. S. 339 (1880) A case which found a state judge to be guilty of
the same statute as used in the Classic case for excluding Negro jurors
from the panel.
22 325 U. S. 91 (1945).
23 Id. at 107, 108.
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when its laws are violated. Further, the state by its silence
sanctions and ratifies the acts of its agents. 24
This reasoning has two advantages over that used in the
Screws decision. First, it avoids the dilemma of finding that an
act was done under "color of state law" when it was obviously a
violation of state law. Secondly, it limits the decision to those
cases in which the state refuses to prosecute its agent. As the
decision stands, there is nothing to prevent a federal prosecu-
tion for the "state act" after the state prosecution for that act.
A more recent case concerning the "color of state law"
concept is Monroe v. Pope.25 Here the action was brought under
the civil counterpart of the statute in the Screws case. An action
for damages was brought against Chicago police officers for
illegal search and seizure. The majority of the Court found the
Classic and Screws cases to be in point, thereby finding "color
of state law". Justice Frankfurter in his dissent decided that the
statute applied only to activities sanctioned by the state, after
a "reconsideration" of his views as expressed in the Screws case.
Justice Frankfurter, like Justice Bradley, was concerned with the
erosion of our scheme of government,
... respect for principles which the court has long regarded
as critical to the most effective functioning of our federalism
should avoid extension of a statute beyond its manifest area
of operation into applications which invite conflict with the
administration of local policies. Such an extension makes the
extreme limits of federal constitutional power a law to
regulate the quotidian business of every traffic policeman,
every registrar of elections, every city inspector or investi-
gator, every clerk in every municipal licensing bureau in
this countryY6
State Aid of Private Interests
Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the most controversial case
of the "state action" cases is Shelly v. Kramer.27 In this case, it
24 This does not mean that the state is responsible for seeing that all dis-
crimination is punished. It is however responsible for the conduct of
its agents.
25 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
26 Id. at 241, 242.
27 334 U. S. 1 (1948).
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was decided that restrictive covenants limiting the use of real
property to persons of the Caucasian race were violative of the
equal protection clause when enforced by state courts. Justice
Vinson, speaking for the majority, said:
Nor is the fourteenth amendment ineffective simply
because the particular pattern of discrimination, which the
state has enforced, was defined initially by the terms of a
private agreement. State action, as that term is understood
for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment, refers to the
exertion of state power in all forms. 28
That statement as used in this decision must mean at least
this: Any time a state court lends its authority to support an
individual's act, that act is a state act for the purposes of the
fourteenth amendment.2 Such a proposition, used without
qualification, as it is in this decision, effectively erases the "state
action" provisions of the fourteenth amendment. If any private
discrimination may be successfully attacked in state court (other-
wise the state would be denying equal protection) then that act
is obviously unlawful. It has been suggested that the decision
may be defended against such criticism by drawing a distinction
between the words compelling and allowing. That is that the
Shelly case stands for the proposition that a state may not compel
a seller not to sell to a Negro in performance of a covenant. It
does not mean that the state will not allow the seller not to sell
to a Negro. According to this line of argument, what is pro-
hibited is the state enforcing discrimination against unwilling
parties even though the basis for the discrimination is a private
agreement. In other words, contracts which force one party to
discriminate are unenforceable as against the obligor so forced. 30
28 1d. at 20.
29 See Henkin, Shelly v. Ksmzer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 473 (1962).
30 Cf. Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery Ass'n, 348 U. S. 880
(1954). In that case, a widow of an Indian man owned burial plot,
bought on contract that only Caucasians be buried there. The state
supreme court held the contract binding and the U. S. Supreme Court
affirmed on an equally divided vote. Since one party wished volun-
tarily to discriminate, does that mean that at least part of the court is
concerned with state compulsion of discrimination and not mere en-
forcement?
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If this were what the decision said, it would certainly confine
its implications considerably. It would mean that any individual
at any given time would be free to decide whether or not he
wished to discriminate or not, according to his personal desires.
The decision, it would seem, however, means just the opposite.
The other major type of state aid to private interests is
exemplified by Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth.A In that case,
a private restaurant located in a publicly owned and operated
automobile parking building refused to serve plaintiff solely be-
cause he was a Negro. Justice Clark, speaking for a divided court,
said:
As the Chancellor pointed out, in its lease with Eagle,
the leasing restaurant, the Authority could have affirmatively
required Eagle to discharge its responsibilities under the
fourteenth amendment imposed upon the private enterprise
as a consequence of state participation. But no state may ef-
fectively abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring them
or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive
might be . . . By its inaction, the authority, and through
it the state, has not only made itself a party to the refusal
of service, but has elected to place its power, property, and
prestige behind the admitted discrimination. 32
Why is it the responsibility of the state to see that no dis-
crimination is practiced? Justice Clark supplies the following
reasons: (1) The restaurant may get added business due to the
nearby parking lot;3 3 (2) Some of the fixtures attached by the
restaurant have become chattels real and therefore enjoy the tax
exemption of the state;34 and (3) The profits from the restaurant
"earned by discrimination" go to the state in the form of rent.35
It should be noted that as to reason (1) that a restaurant located
on one side of the street might derive benefit from a municipally
owned parking lot on the other side of the street. It should
seem to be stretching a point to say that private activity might be
made state activity simply because it receives incidental benefit
31365 U. S. 715 (1961).
32 Id. at 725.
33 Id. at 724.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
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from or is conducted in close proximity to a state government
enterprise. As to the tax benefit to the lessee, this is not exactly
a state gift. Very often lease agreements provide that the lessor
shall pay certain taxes thereby relieving the lessee of cettain tax
burdens. Such factors are taken into consideration when the
amount of rent is decided upon. In fact, as to both of the fore-
going reasons mentioned by Justice Clark, there is nothing to
indicate that the rent paid did not include any benefit which
might accrue to the lessee as a result of the state government
ownership of the building and the parking lot. When the au-
thority decided to lease the -building and the parking lot, the
public was invited to bid and did so bid, the highest bidder
for this particular space being the Eagle. The restaurant did not
receive any special privileges. The sole object of the authority,
as admitted by Justice Clark, was to obtain additional revenues.
Any benefit the restaurant got, it paid for. As to the last point,
it amounts to this: A state may not receive moneys from an en-
terprise which engages in practices which the state may not en-
gage in. Since most states tax every business enterprise in one
form or another, this statement, similar to others already noted,
is completely open-ended.
All of these reasons, according to Justice Clark, add up to
"that degree of state participation and involvement" which the
fourteenth amendment condemns.
State Custom
While the state custom theory is expounded significantly
only in the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Gardner
v. Louisiana," due to its impact in this field it is treated as a major
area of thought. In the Garner case, Negro petitioners staged a
sit-in demonstration in the white section of a restaurant lunch
counter. The owner of the restaurant called the local police
who arrested the petitioners for "disturbing the peace." The
majority of the Court found that there was "no evidence of
any crime".3 Justice Douglas, concurring, found that the custom
of the state was as effective as a statute of the state insofar
as the state action mandate of the fourteenth amendment was con-
cerned. Says Justice Douglas:
36 368 U. S. 157 (1961).
37 Id. at 174.
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Though there may have been no state law or municipal
ordinance that in terms required segregation of the races in
restaurants, it is plain that the proprietors in the instant
cases were segregating blacks from whites pursuant to local
custom. Segregation is basic to Louisiana as a community;
the custom it maintains is at least as powerful as any law.
If these proprietors choose segregation, their preference does
not make their action "private" rather than "state" action. If
it did, a miniscule of private prejudice would convert state
into private action. Moreover, where the segregation policy
is the policy of a state, it matters not that the agency to
enforci it is a private enterprise.38
The reason that the segregation policy may be attributed to
the state says Justice Douglas, is due to the many segregating
statutes which Louisiana has in force. Consider this analysis
of his reasoning: When Justice Douglas says that the proprietor
is following Louisiana's custom in segregating, he can hardly
be argued with.9 But when he attempts to attribute the custom
to the statutes of the state, he is putting the horse before the
cart.40 The statutes, just like the proprietor's choice to segregate,
are a product of a custom that has been in existence since slavery
began. As he points out, segregation is basic to the community.
The moving force is the rank and file of the community-it is
the individual. Viewed in this light, the statement that the
preference of the proprietor does not convert "state" action into
"private" action is nothing short of amazing. The state didn't
have anything to do with it in the first place. If any factqrs are
going to "convert" they must be factors to convert clearly private
action into state action.
Note the emphasis that is put on force. Does state action
include any custom with strong coercive force over the com-
munity? 4' Very often, and in fact in this case, that coercive
force will be social custom. It is not that the proprietor does not
think the Negroes will pay for the food they eat; or that they
will tear up the furniture; or that they will make the restaurant
38 id. at 181.
39 See generally Schwelb, The Sit-In Demonstration: Criminal Trespass or
Constitutional Right, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. (1961).
40 For a list of those statutes see 368 U. S. 180.
41 Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Col. L. Rev. 1083, 1093.
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unsightly-he admits that these are not his reasons when he admits
them to a separate area of the lunch counter. The owner prac-
tices segregation because he knows that his white customers will
find it socially disagreeable to eat with Negroes. The storeowner
finds that following the social custom is economically advanta-
geous. And the homeowner in sending out dinner invitations may
find the social custom of segregation psychologically advanta-
geous. Justice Douglas' opinion gives no hint that there is any
reason to distinguish the restaurant owner from the homeowner.
Once it is established that the state (or the people of the state)
have a custom of segregation, then all discriminatory acts are
state acts within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
General Analysis
These, then, are the four major devices which have been used
to find "state action" indirectly: (1) A private organization vested
with governmental authority; (2) Color of state law; (3) State
aid of private discrimination, and (4) State custom.
It is submitted that the first three of these either on their
face or as applied deal more with "state inaction" than with
"state action".42 "State inaction" is synonymous with "state
action" only when there is an affirmative duty on the part of the
state to perform that act.
Thus, in the Classic case, the state was under an affirmative
duty to provide a fair system of elections. Election procedures
and responsibilities are clearly governmental functions. But in
the Marsh case, the state is under no duty to regulate the ingress
and egress of persons over private property no matter how public
the owner may have made it for some purposes. Justice Black says
the state "permits" the company to govern the town. By the
42 "State inaction" has been dealt with by the court directly. In Smith v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U. S. 587 (1926), the telephone company filed
a proposed schedule to raise rates. Through various dilatory procedures
the state public utilities commission sat around and managed to do
nothing. After the telephone company had operated at a loss for two
years, it brought an action in federal court to enjoin the enforcement
of established rates on the theory that they were confiscatory. The
Court said: "Property may be as effectively taken by a long continued
and unreasonable delay in putting an end to confiscatory rates as by
an express affirmance of them." Thus, the state had effected a denial
of due process without ever lifting a finger.
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use of the word "permit", he admits that the state has not acted
but rather that it could have acted. Since the stipulation of
terms as between licensee and licensor are not a function reason-
ably falling on state governments, the fourteenth amendment
would not be applicable.
Similarly, in the Screws case, the state is under a duty to see
that its agents act reasonably and properly in the administration
of official functions. When it condones improper acts it has
failed to meet an affirmative duty. If, on the other hand, the
state prosecutes for the wrongful act of its agents the act of
the agent is then the antithesis of a "state act". The state has
declared its hostility toward that act and performed its affirmative
duty. As suggested earlier, this avoids finding a violation of
state law to be "state action".
The Shelly decision is a clear-cut example of the "state
inaction" analysis. Here the state did nothing but enforce the
terms of a private agreement, but because the state at one point
could have easily prevented discrimination, the court found that
its failure to do so was a state act. Thus, according to the Court,
"state exertions of authority in all forms" includes failure to
exert state authority in any direction it could have been exerted.
But the state is under no affirmative duty to dictate terms of
private contracts. Thus, according to the suggested analysis, there
would be no "state action".
The Burton case is similarly explainable. Because the state
was the lessor of the restaurant, it had the opportunity to con-
trol discriminatory practices. However, the restaurant serves no
governmental function. And the state is under no duty to regu-
late the clientele in restaurants. Thus, while the state did not
act when it could have, there is no state action because there is
no duty to act. There is no reason to treat restaurants differently
simply because the property on which it is situated is rented from
the state, rather than from an individual.
As for Justice Douglas's "local custom" argument, little
can be added to what has already been said. Insofar as equal
protection considerations are concerned, local custom is almost
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inevitably the source of the discrimination involved. The argu-
ment does not carve out an exception to the "state action" rule.
Rather, it precludes any meaningful discussion of that rule.
It is earnestly contended by this writer that the failure to
distinguish between acts that a state may perform and acts which
the state is under a duty to perform is the principle source of
confusion in regard to the state action concept.43 The following
statement of Justice Douglas in the Garner case is an example:
But the necessity of a license shows that the public has
rights in respect to those premises. The business is not a
mere matter of private concern. Those who license enter-
prises for public use should not have under our Constitution
the power to license it for the use of one race. For there is
an overriding constitutional requirement that all state power
be exercised so as not to deny equal protection to any
group. 4
4
Note, first of all, that the license referred to is not just for
one race. The state license is for anyone the owner chooses to
serve. Service for one race is the owner's idea, not the state's.
The confusion which statements like this breed, however, is
this: Because the public has some rights in respect to private
premises for some purposes it has rights for all purposes.45 This
is not logically correct.46 The state may say that if the patron
wishes to buy and the owner wishes to sell a pork chop that chop
must be cooked under sanitary conditions. The control of the
state and the right of the public comes in only after the first
two conditions are met, i. e., consent of the buyer and seller.
Such judicial statements as this one lead to monstrous prop-
ositions. The state may require a door to door salesman to buy
a license. Does that mean that he must stop at every door? Does
43 As already suggested, the judicial stampede in every direction on this
point had led some writers to feel that the concept of "state action"
has become totally unwieldly. See Horowitz, The Misleading Search
for "State Action" Under The Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 208 (1957).
44Note 36 supra at 185.
45 For a die-hard attempt to make some sense out of "public right" concepts,
see Van Alstyne and Karst, State Action, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1962).
46 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. 762, 773.
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that mean he may not skip over colored neighborhoods? If the
requirement of a license gives the public a "right", does that
"right" include being charged a fair price determined by the
government? Does the requirement of a license make a business
a public utility?
Conclusion
This article is an attempt to point out the very real danger of
unnecessarily broad reasoning being used to find "state action"
in any given case. The broad precedents set by the Court in
recent years all but sweep away the authority of local govern-
ments to make policies which protect essentially local interests.
It is submitted (in accordance with Hamilton's views) that the
local governments are the safest repository for the administration
of criminal and civil justice and that such local administration
is an essential element in the preservation of our federalism.47
4 7 See generally Fordham, The States in the Federal System, Vital Role or
Limbo; For an exhaustive analysis of the circumstances surrounding
the writing of the fourteenth amendment and its "state action" concept,
see Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws" 50 Col. L. Rev. 131 (1950).
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